Vigil

Privacy Policy

Last updated: 20 November 2026

Vigil sits in the path of your AI API calls, so the only honest place to start is what we can see and what we keep. This page answers both — and for the records the proxy keeps of each call and of each request it refuses or cannot complete, it answers at the level of individual database columns. Where the answer is uncomfortable, or where we do not yet know, it says so instead of rounding.

1.Who we are and how to reach us

Vigil is operated by Evolmet B.V., a private limited company (besloten vennootschap) registered in the Netherlands. These are the details a supervisory authority, an OAuth reviewer, or your own vendor due-diligence process will ask for, so they are stated here rather than left to be requested:

IdentificationAs registered
Legal nameEvolmet B.V.
Trade register (KvK)42006185
Registered addressSaturnusstraat 95, 2516 AG ’s-Gravenhage, Netherlands
VAT numberNL869250759B01
Contactinfo@vigil.tools

Which role we occupy depends on which data you mean, and this policy never blurs the two. Evolmet B.V. is the controller for your account data — how you sign in, what plan you are on, your settings — and decides why and how that is processed. For the telemetry produced by the AI traffic you route through the proxy, Evolmet B.V. is a processor acting on your instructions, and you are the controller. Section 2 sets out the split in full; the Article 28 terms for the processor half are in the Data Processing Addendum.

Vigil is an AI-observability service. It has two parts: a dashboard at vigil.tools and a proxy at api.vigil.tools (also reachable at its earlier address, api.vigil.wtf) that sits in the path of the AI API calls you route through it.

For anything in this policy, and to exercise any right described in section 11, email info@vigil.tools. Use this contact for privacy requests, support and security reports. We may ask for proportionate information to verify your identity before disclosing or deleting personal data.

We have not appointed a Data Protection Officer. The Article 37 assessment remains open: it includes whether our core activities involve large-scale regular and systematic monitoring of individuals, or large-scale processing of special-category or criminal-conviction and offence data, and any applicable national requirements. The contact above is our privacy contact, not an appointed DPO.

2.The two data flows, and our role in each

Vigil holds two different kinds of data and occupies a different legal role in each. This distinction shapes everything below it, so it comes first.

The dataYou areWe are
Your account — how you sign in, what plan you are on, your settingsThe data subjectThe controller
Telemetry about the AI traffic you route through the proxyThe controller, or a processor acting for your controllerA processor or sub-processor acting on documented instructions

What that means in practice. For your account, we decide why and how the data is processed, and this policy is our disclosure to you. For the traffic you send through the proxy, you decide what goes through it. If your prompts carry personal data belonging to your own users, that is your decision and your lawful basis to establish, or your controller's instructions to follow where you act as a processor. Vigil does not choose the purpose of your users' requests. Any processing for our own independent service-security purposes must be distinguished from this instructed processing; the remaining role assessment is described in section 19. The Article 28 terms for that relationship are in the Data Processing Addendum.

With model routing On for an agent, Vigil may send that agent's requests to a cheaper model from the same provider, using your key. The saving shown is an estimate. When routing sends a conversation to a cheaper model and that model's answer fails, is refused, or stops at its token limit, Vigil may send your request once more, unchanged, to the model your request asked for, with your key, and return that answer instead. Both calls are recorded, and your provider bills both.

3.What we hold about you

From signing in

Authentication runs on Supabase Auth. You can sign in with an email address and password, or with GitHub or Google. If you use one of those providers, Supabase stores the profile fields the provider returns — which is more than Vigil itself uses:

StoredWhere it comes fromWhat Vigil does with it
Email address, and whether it is verifiedYou, or your GitHub/Google profileIdentifies your account; the only field the app itself reads
Name, full name, usernameYour GitHub or Google profileNothing. Stored by Supabase Auth as part of the sign-in record; no Vigil screen displays it
Avatar or profile picture URLYour GitHub or Google profileNothing. Same as above — it is a link to an image on the provider, not a copy of it
Provider account identifierGitHub or GoogleLinks your sign-in to the same account next time
A Vigil user id (a UUID we generate)UsEvery row below is keyed on it
Account created, last signed inUsSupport and abuse investigation
The IP address and browser of each signed-in session, and a log entry for each sign-in, sign-out and session refreshSupabase Auth, from the requests that sign you in and keep you signed inNothing. No Vigil screen reads them. Section 8 says where Supabase keeps them and for how long
The campaign that brought you, if anyThe link you arrived onTells us which marketing actually works. Four values — source, medium, campaign, content — taken from the signup URL. If you arrived directly, the record exists with all four values empty
The first page you saw, and the sign-up request’s IP address and browser user agentThe address you arrived on, carried in the URL, and the sign-up requestSince 5 November 2026, for every account: what lets our server tell Plausible that your sign-up, your first call and a payment belong to the visit and campaign that brought you (section 10) rather than to “Direct”. The IP address and user agent are cleared 90 days after sign-up, by a daily job; the first page and the campaign stay with the account. The first page is a path on our site; the address kept with it carries only our own campaign tags
A log of each report our server sends to RedditOur server, when it reports a sign-up, a first call or a paymentSince 5 November 2026: the event name, a one-way checksum of your account id and the event, which attempt it was, Reddit’s answer and how long it took. No token, no match keys. Kept 30 days, then deleted by a daily job; it is what lets us see that a report failed and send it again
What the ad platforms may match you on, only with your answerThe sign-up request, if you accepted the matching cookiesSince 5 November 2026: if you accepted advertising cookies, the Reddit identifier its pixel set and the Reddit ad-click identifier if an ad brought you — and only then does the IP address and user agent above go to Reddit as well; if you accepted analytics cookies, PostHog’s identifier for your browser. These are what our server sends with the reports in section 10. If you declined, each identifier is empty — recorded as empty, never guessed — and nothing is sent to that platform
A note that a sign-up or a new paid plan was reported, one for eachUs, when you first arrive or come back from payingStops it being reported twice (section 10). It goes when your account goes

We are listing the name and avatar fields even though nothing in Vigil reads them, because they are held and you are entitled to know that. If you would rather they were not, sign in with email and password instead of a provider.

From using the product

StoredDetail
SettingsTheme, notification preferences, your plan, and, if you have had the free trial, when it started and when it ends; for each agent and each optimisation, the mode you chose, its options (for prompt caching, the cache lifetime; for history trimming, how many recent turns it keeps), and when you switched it on and last changed it; your account-wide default for each optimisation, if you set one — its mode, its options, and when you switched it on and last changed it; for each agent you stopped with the kill switch, when you stopped it; and, for an optimisation that can change answers, per agent: the share of conversations it is tried on, when it first ran in Shadow mode and when Vigil last checked the trial — which Vigil records itself — and, when a trial did worse than the calls it is compared with, when Vigil set its share to zero and why, from a fixed list — with when its share, its first Shadow day or a stop last changed, how many times they have changed since it was created, and whether the alert for a stopped trial is still to be filed
API key recordsA SHA-256 digest of each key, a short display prefix, the label you gave it, and timestamps. The key itself is shown once and never stored — we cannot recover one for you
Billing identifiersYour Stripe customer and subscription ids. Card details never reach us; see section 12
Alert rulesAny monitoring rules you configure
Team invitationsThe email address you invited, its role and status
Feature waitlistThe email address you enter when asking to be told about a feature that is not built yet
Plan code redemptionsIf you redeemed a code, the fact that you did
Usage meterPer billing period (before the switch to plan limits on money saved: the calendar month): how many calls we counted toward your plan, how much optimised spend they represented, and when that count last changed. Optimised spend is kept two ways. The first is the bill, for the calls Vigil’s cache markers optimised. The second, where the meter counted it, covers every call an optimisation changed: its bill plus the saving Vigil measured on it. That figure is never less than zero and never an estimate — what history trimming or model routing may have saved is not counted. Beside it, for each period, one SHA-256 checksum per optimised prompt shape, made from two of the section 4 fingerprints, recorded for each prompt shape Vigil optimised. No plan limits optimised agents any more, so these checksums limit nothing; and, if the meter ever failed to count a call, or to count the optimised spend of a call it counted, a note of that call’s id, the database’s error message and when it happened. Since 10 October 2026, when the plan limits on money saved started, the meter also holds, per period, how much Vigil saved you on the calls where an optimisation was applied — the measured figure, and apart from it the estimated savings of history trimming and model routing — and the moments that figure first reached 80% and 100% of your plan’s limit; and one lifetime row per account with the same two totals, counted from 25 September 2026, and the moment they first reached the Free plan’s once-ever limit. Until that day the meter also held, if your optimised spend in a period reached your plan’s limit, the plan you were on, the day it first did, the latest period it was at the limit, and when that record last changed; that was how the 30-day grace period was counted, and the record was removed on 10 October 2026 with the grace period itself. The lifetime row, like the rest of the meter, is deleted with your account. No prompts, models or agent names. It only counts upward; see section 11 for why it is not cleared with your history
Limit emailsOne record per email we sent you about your plan’s limit on money saved: which notice it was (80% or 100%), the billing period it was for (on Free, whose limit is once ever, the word lifetime), when it was sent, and the message id our email provider returned — or, in place of a send, a note that the 80% notice was overtaken by the 100% one. Never the address it went to and never the email’s text. Deleted with your account

4.What the proxy records about each call

One row per call you route through api.vigil.tools or api.vigil.wtf — until your plan's monthly logged-call volume is used up, after which a call is still forwarded and counted but not logged. This is the complete list of what that row contains.

Usage and cost

  • Input, output, cache-read and cache-creation token counts, the input-plus-output total, and how much of the cache creation was for the one-hour cache lifetime
  • Cost in USD, and the cache-read ratio. On a Gemini call whose request named an explicit context cache (cachedContent), no cost is recorded: Google bills that cache’s storage by the hour, to the cache rather than to any one call, so no call can state its own cost; the record says so with a short code, and the token counts are kept as usual. Calls that use Gemini’s automatic (implicit) caching are priced
  • How many web searches the provider billed on the call; when the call used advisor, fallback or compaction steps, how many billed model steps the provider reported, the model’s own turns included; and how much the searches and those extra steps added to the cost
  • Latency in milliseconds
  • Model and provider names. A model id of up to 512 bytes is kept as the provider or your request gave it. It can carry your cloud account number or organisation name — for example, an AWS inference-profile ARN or an OpenAI fine-tuned model id. A model id over 512 bytes is not kept. Neither is one containing a control character. The call is then recorded with its model as unknown. On Bedrock and Vertex AI, the model id is also part of the request path, which is kept as sent
  • How the call was priced, where recorded: the platform that served it and that platform’s own id for the model, whether it went to a global, regional or multi-region endpoint, the billing mode (for example on-demand or batch), whether the prompt was long enough to fall in a long-context price tier, and the evidence behind the rate — for example VERIFIED, read off the provider’s own price list
  • Success or error status; the error type when one occurred; and the names of any problems our detectors found on the call, even a successful one — for example pii_leak or cost_spike — never the evidence
  • The HTTP status code the provider returned. Calls Vigil refused at its API-key check before 7 October 2026 carry the status Vigil returned instead; since then a refused call is not stored as a call, only as a refused-request record (section 8 of the Privacy Policy)
  • The provider’s own error code when a call failed — for example authentication_error — drawn from a fixed list we recognise, or the word “unrecognized”
  • When we can tell why a call failed, a one-sentence reason in our own words, from a fixed list — for example “The provider rejected the API key as invalid”. Never the provider’s wording.
  • What the call would have cost without Vigil’s cache markers, and the difference from the bill — the saving, which can be negative; for an agent with prompt caching in Shadow mode, Vigil’s estimate of that saving; and a short code when a saving could not be worked out. Where recorded, when an optimisation changed the call, what it would have cost without Vigil’s changes — Vigil’s estimate where history trimming changed it; the bill alone where a saving could not be worked out; zero where the bill itself could not be — and zero when no optimisation changed the call

Fingerprints of your prompt shape

  • prefix_hash, system_hash, tools_order_hash — 8-character FNV-1a checksums
  • An estimated token length for the cacheable prefix
  • On OpenAI-compatible providers, where recorded, the cache key Vigil sends — or, in Shadow mode, would send — so the provider can reuse its cache: two more checksums of the same kind, one of the model with your system messages and one of the model with your tool definitions

Prompt structure — counts, lengths and a yes/no flag, plus one fragment kept verbatim: tool names

  • The character LENGTH of your system prompt
  • The NUMBER of tools on the request
  • The NAMES of your tools
  • Whether a timestamp was detected in the prefix, and if one was, which kind of pattern matched (a date, a time, a long number) and how many characters it was — never the text. Until 10 October 2026 an excerpt of up to 32 characters was stored; those were deleted that day
  • The token offset of your first cache marker, and the model’s minimum cacheable length

Labels and identifiers

  • The id of the Vigil account the call belongs to
  • The agent label you supply in the X-Vigil-Agent header, when it is at most 1,024 bytes long. A longer one is never stored: in its place we keep agent-label-too-long: followed by a fingerprint of it, the first 16 hexadecimal characters of its SHA-256 hash
  • Whether the call presented a valid Vigil API key — or, in the rare case the check itself failed inside Vigil and the call was forwarded anyway, that it failed. Until 7 October 2026 a call refused at the check was also stored, with what the check found: missing, not found or revoked, or belonging to a different Vigil account; since then such a call is kept only as a refused-request record (section 8 of the Privacy Policy)
  • A row id and a timestamp for the call itself, and — when there was one — the request id we returned to you in the x-vigil-request-id response header: a random identifier we generate when the request arrives, so you can find the call later
  • Whether the call is Vigil’s own test traffic, decided from a fixed list of Vigil’s test agents and accounts
  • The path you called on the provider, as you sent it, never the query string — for example v1/messages. It can name your Google Cloud project and region (Vertex AI); your AWS region and model, or an inference-profile ARN that includes your AWS account number (Bedrock); or a provider’s id for a batch or a file
  • Where recorded, an identifier for the provider-side cache the call could use, which keeps one credential’s cache apart from another’s. For Google Vertex AI it is your Google Cloud project id and location, in clear. For other providers it is a one-way digest of the provider credential the request carried — on Bedrock, with the AWS region in clear — never the credential itself. The digest is keyed (an HMAC-SHA256 under a secret only Vigil holds), not encryption: it cannot be turned back into the credential, and without that secret it cannot be matched to a credential either; the same credential gives the same digest. Until 10 October 2026 it was an unkeyed checksum, which a party already holding the key could have matched; those values were removed from every call record that day
  • Three fields reserved for a session id, a parent-call id and a trace id, which the proxy does not write. The only rows with a value in them are Vigil’s own test traffic from June 2026, each holding a random session id

Cache decision metadata

  • The cache lifetime chosen, the estimated cached span, and how many cache markers were placed
  • Where the cache markers went — the system prompt, the messages or the tools — whether the cached span stopped at a timestamp, and whether your system prompt was sent as plain text
  • Whether the call qualified for Vigil’s caching and, when Vigil did not add cache markers, why not, from a fixed list — for example your request already carried its own, part of the prompt changes on every call, the prompt was shorter than the model’s minimum, the provider caches automatically, the request was signed with AWS SigV4 so it could not be changed, or the step failed — and a broader label for that reason, such as whether it would resolve itself as the prompt grows or needs the prompt to change; with the figures behind that decision: the span measured, the model’s minimum and the model it came from, which part of the prompt changed, how much text came before a timestamp, the shape of the system prompt, and the kind of AWS credential used
  • On OpenAI-compatible providers: how the provider caches, where Vigil puts its cache key — a field in the request or a header — whether Vigil asked the provider to report token usage on a streamed call and, if not, why not, and pricing notes: why a call could not be priced, from a fixed list — for example a service tier Vigil has no price for — the price-list entry it was priced as when that differs from the model’s name, and whether a cache saving can be shown for that model. The same short code says why a Gemini call that named an explicit context cache has no cost (its storage is billed to the cache, not to the call)
  • For an agent in Shadow mode, what the saving estimate rested on: the typical gap between the calls it was compared with, this one included; roughly how many calls one cache write would serve at that pace — the cache lifetime divided by that gap, capped at 10,000; how many earlier calls from the past seven days it drew on; and the span it assumed would be cached

Optimisation decisions, trials, and how the response ended

  • For each optimisation, the mode you set and the mode actually applied to the call — and, where recorded, whether the setting came from the agent, from your account default, or from Vigil’s default of Off when neither was set, and why the applied mode was lower than the one you set, from a fixed list (for example: your request switched it off with X-Vigil-Optimise or X-Vigil-Skip, your plan’s limit applied, the provider does not support it, Vigil could not verify your Vigil API key on the call, the call fell in the group a trial is compared with, or the optimisation had not yet run a full day in Shadow mode)
  • Whether Vigil added cache markers to the call, and whether your request already carried its own; and, where recorded, what each optimisation did — changed the request, would have changed it (Shadow mode), decided not to, failed and let the request go on unchanged, or did not run
  • Where recorded, for each optimisation, the saving attributed to it, whether that figure was measured or is Vigil’s estimate — Shadow mode is always an estimate, and so is what history trimming saves in On — and a short code when it could not be worked out
  • For an optimisation that can change answers — history trimming or model routing — where recorded: whether the call fell, or in Shadow mode would have fallen, in the group the optimisation is tried on or in the group it is compared with; the share of conversations set to be tried at the time; and, for each such optimisation, a number from 0 to 9,999 that decides the group and lets a trial count conversations rather than calls. It is the same on every call that shares the conversation’s first user message — or its X-Vigil-Conversation header, when you send one — and the agent label. Vigil works it out in memory from your account id, that label and that message or header; neither the message nor the header is written down. The number cannot be turned back into either, but someone who already had your account id, the label and a message could confirm the match — and with only 10,000 numbers, many messages share each one
  • Where recorded, how the model’s response ended, from a fixed list — it finished, stopped at a token limit, stopped to call a tool, stopped at a stop sequence, refused, was blocked by a content filter, or other — how many tool calls it made, how many tool calls it attempted with arguments that were not valid JSON, and whether it was refused or blocked. Never the arguments themselves, and never the words of a refusal
  • For history trimming, where recorded: how many recent turns it keeps, how many earlier turns and messages it dropped — or, in Shadow mode, would have dropped — and an estimate of how many tokens they held; when it dropped none, why, from a fixed list — for example a cache marker sat on the part it would drop, the conversation carried the model’s thinking, the conversation was too short, or the request was too large to examine; and, on providers that cache automatically, whether the provider’s cache reached past that part and what dropping it would have saved
  • For model routing, where recorded: the model it would have chosen for the call and the model your request asked for; the size band and the tool-count band of the conversation’s opening — its system prompt, tool definitions and first message — and the opening’s length in characters, never its text; the routing level the agent was at, and the lowest level that would route the call; the estimated saving — net of the prompt-cache saving that switching models would give up and of the cost of the conversation coming back to the model your request asked for, and absent when that cannot be priced — and how much prompt-cache saving switching would give up; when it would have kept the model your request asked for, why, from a fixed list — for example the model was pinned, the request needed something the cheaper model lacks (and what, from a fixed list — for example extended thinking the request asked for, thinking the conversation carries from an earlier turn, or a model that thinks by default where the cheaper one does not), the opening’s bands are above the agent’s level, or the cheaper model would cost more once the conversation’s return to the model your request asked for is counted; and, where it applies, whether that return is expected on the conversation’s next call, or this call is one that came back after an earlier call was routed. The models it chooses between are the one your request asked for and cheaper ones from the same provider: the next one down, and no further; like any model id, the one your request asked for can carry your cloud account number or organisation name. The choice depends on the conversation’s opening, not its later turns, so every call of a conversation is routed the same way — except a call the cheaper model could not take
  • Optimisation details: which optimisations ran and why, such as the cache duration chosen, the effort level, and the kind of request (for example extraction or maths) that Vigil estimates in memory from the request. Codes and numbers only, never your text.

Characters our database can't store are replaced with �.

Scores you send. When we accept a score you send for a call — a whole number from 1 to 5, posted to /v1/feedback with the request id we returned in the x-vigil-request-id header — we keep it in a record of its own: the account it belongs to, that request id, the score and when it arrived. A later score for the same request replaces the earlier one. Nothing else you send with it is kept. We do not use scores for anything other than comparing the calls an optimisation changed with the calls it did not. They are part of your call history: Delete all data removes them with it, and so does deleting your account.

The agent name is a label you choose and send in the X-Vigil-Agent header. If you put something identifying in it, we store what you sent. A label longer than 1,024 bytes is never stored: in its place we keep a fingerprint of it, the first 16 hexadecimal characters of its SHA-256 hash, so its calls, alerts and settings stay together.

5.What we never store

There is no database column for any of the following, so this is a statement about the schema rather than a policy we apply to it:

  • Your prompt text, apart from the tool names disclosed separately
  • Your message content
  • The model’s responses
  • Your tool definitions, arguments and results — the schemas, descriptions, call arguments and what the tools returned. The names of your tools are the one exception, disclosed separately
  • The text of a provider’s error message

Your prompts and the model's responses are not stored. No message bodies, no system prompts, no completions, no tool arguments or results. The proxy reads the request in memory to do its job (section 7) and writes only what this page lists: the call record and the scores you send in section 4, the detector findings below and the alert Vigil files when it stops a trial, the record in section 8 of a request it refuses or cannot complete, your API key's last-used time, the monthly usage meter, and the trial settings Vigil records itself, both of which section 3 lists in full — with the one exception in section 6, which we would rather spell out than let you discover.

Provider error messages are not stored either. When a call fails we record the HTTP status and the provider's machine-readable error code, never the message text. When we can tell why a call failed, we also store a one-sentence reason we wrote ourselves, chosen from a fixed list — the provider's wording is still discarded.

When our detectors find a problem we store the finding, never the evidence. If the model emits personal data, the stored record names the kinds found — for example email, phone — and never the values.

6.The one exception: content we do keep

One thing derived from your prompt is stored as text. It exists to diagnose caching problems, it applies only to calls to Claude models — sent to Anthropic directly, or through AWS Bedrock or Google Vertex AI — and it is a real fragment of what you sent rather than a statistic about it. You should learn it here rather than from a schema.

The names of your tools, verbatim. Not their descriptions, input schemas, arguments or results — the names only, in the order you sent them, because reordering tools silently destroys your cache and we cannot tell you that without knowing the order. If your tool names are themselves sensitive, treat them as visible to us.

A timestamp is detected, never kept. A clock or date inside the cacheable part of your prompt rewrites it on every call and destroys the cache. When we find one in your system prompt or a tool description, we store which kind of pattern matched (for example a date, a time or a long number) and how many characters it was, never the text itself. Until 10 October 2026 the matched text, up to 32 characters, was stored; those values were deleted from every call record that day.

On the fingerprints

We also store three short checksums of the cacheable part of your request — one of the system prompt, one of the tool ordering, one of both together. They are 8-character non-reversible hashes, used only to compare calls with one another — whether two share a prefix, the same system prompt or the same tool names — for example, to find why a cache was missed, or to count the optimised prompt shapes your plan's limit applies to (section 3). They are not encryption and we cannot recover your prompt from them, but they are derived from it: two identical prompts produce identical hashes. On OpenAI-compatible providers, the cache key section 4 lists is two more checksums of the same kind, of the model with your system messages and of the model with your tool definitions.

We treat the fingerprints as personal data. A hash of text that may contain personal data can still identify someone to a party holding the text, so we do not argue that the checksums are anonymous. They are protected, exported and deleted with the rest of your call record, exactly as the tool names are.

7.What happens in memory and is never written

The proxy reads your full request in transit. It has to. It parses the request body to find the cacheable span of your prompt and place cache markers — and, where history trimming or model routing runs for an agent, to tell which conversation the call belongs to, which earlier messages trimming would drop, and, for routing, how long the conversation's opening is, how many tools it defines, and whether the request needs something a cheaper model cannot handle (such as images, documents, certain tools, structured output, extended thinking, or more input or output than it supports). It scans the model's response for personal data the model produced itself so it can warn you, and, where Vigil records how a response ended, reads it to see how — whether it finished, stopped at a token limit, was refused, or called a tool with arguments that are not valid JSON. This happens in memory, for the duration of the request, on Cloudflare's edge network.

None of that content is written to disk by us. What persists is what this page lists: the call record and the scores you send in section 4, the detector findings in section 5 and the alert Vigil files when it stops a trial, the record in section 8 of a request we refuse or cannot complete, your API key's last-used time, and the usage meter and the trial settings described in section 3 — with the one exception in section 6. The request is then forwarded to the provider you chose, which receives it in full — that is the point of a proxy, and it is why section 12 lists those providers.

8.Requests we refuse

When we refuse a request — a malformed URL, a rejected API key — or cannot reach the provider or read its answer, or something fails inside the proxy itself, we normally record it in a separate ledger, because there is no model, token count or cost we could record for it and it would otherwise distort your dashboard. That record holds a row id and when it happened; the account named in the address, and that identifier as you typed it, even when it was malformed; the provider you addressed, as you typed it or, once we had recognised it, in lower case; what kind of refusal or failure it was and why; the status we returned; the path as you sent it, without the query string; a truncated diagnostic message; when there was one, the request id we returned to you in the x-vigil-request-id header; and, where recorded, for a request whose Vigil API key we verified while an optimisation able to change answers ran for its agent — in Shadow mode or On, in either group: the agent label you sent, when it is at most 1,024 bytes long, or for a longer one its fingerprint (section 4), the group the request was in, the conversation's number from section 4, and the mode the optimisation ran in, with why it was lower than the one you set. The identifier, the provider and the path are each cut at 200 characters, and the message at 500.

No record is written when the address names an account id that does not exist, or when the flood limit described below applies: once one IP address — or, for a request that arrives without one, one account identifier as typed — has produced 60 records in an hour; once the account the address names has produced 60 in an hour, from any address; or, for a new one, while the running copy of the proxy that received it is already counting 10,000 others. Each running copy counts on its own. Neither limit holds back the record of a provider failure on a request whose Vigil API key we verified while an optimisation able to change answers ran for its agent.

Since 7 October 2026, a request we refuse at the API-key check is kept only in this ledger. It no longer appears in your call history, and it never counts towards your plan's logged calls. Its record never includes an agent label. Refusals already in your call history from before then stay there like any other call.

The proxy does not store your IP address. It reads it from the incoming connection and uses it only, in memory, to stop a flood of refused requests filling the table. There is no column for it in any table we create.

Supabase Auth does keep IP addresses. It runs sign-in for us, as our processor, and keeps them in three places:

  • Your sessions (the auth.sessions table): one for each browser you are signed in on, with the IP address and browser (user-agent) of its latest sign-in or refresh — your address when your browser made that request, our web host’s when our server made it for you. Signing out deletes every session on your account, and so does deleting your account. If you never sign out, a session can be kept until you delete your account.
  • Its audit log: an entry for each sign-in, sign-out and session refresh, with the IP address, the browser and your email address. None is written to our database (its table there, auth.audit_log_entries, is empty), but every entry also goes to Supabase’s own service logs, which are kept apart from our database, in a region we have not confirmed. We can read those logs for up to 7 days, the period Supabase’s documentation gives for our plan. How long Supabase itself keeps them, we have not confirmed: the period its documentation gives is how long we can read them.
  • Two-factor checks (the auth.mfa_challenges table), each with the IP address it came from. Vigil offers no two-factor sign-in, so signing in to Vigil never makes one.

9.How long we keep it

TODO — not yet finalised

This section needs review before it is relied upon. It states current behaviour, which is not the behaviour the plan tiers describe. Read it as a factual disclosure of a gap, not as a policy anyone has approved.

Stating it plainly: today we keep call telemetry indefinitely, on every plan including Free. No call telemetry has ever been deleted by a retention process. Not on one tier, not partially. The refused-request ledger below is the one exception.

The sweep that would enforce the windows below is written and tested, but two independent safety catches have kept it inert: its schedule was not registered until recently, and the switch that lets it delete rather than preview is not set on the production service. The oldest call telemetry in our database is more than three months old on a tier whose intended window is seven days.

We are not going to publish a retention period we do not enforce. When the sweep is armed we will update this page and the date at the top of it before it first runs, not after.

The windows each plan is intended to carry, once enforcement is switched on. These are targets today, not descriptions:

PlanIntended retention window
Free7 days
Plus30 days
Pro90 days
Supreme365 days
EnterpriseSet per contract

As of 6 October 2026, automatic deletion isn’t active yet: nothing has been deleted under these windows on any plan. It starts with the new plans. None of the windows above is currently applied. When they are, they will be ceilings we do not exceed rather than promises to delete at a precise moment.

What this means for you right now

  • Your telemetry persists until you remove it. Two controls do work today, immediately and on demand: Delete all data in Settings clears your call and error history, and deleting your account removes everything except the records listed under “What survives a deletion” in section 11. Both are described there.
  • The refused-request ledger is a partial exception. Its seven-day sweep is not behind the same switch: it runs daily and deletes refused-request records once they are seven days old.
  • Account data is kept while your account exists. Two kinds outlive it. The sign-in entries in Supabase's service logs (section 8) stay for as long as Supabase keeps those logs. Billing and accounting records outlive it too: as a Dutch company we are bound by the fiscal retention obligation (art. 52(4) AWR and art. 2:10(3) BW) to keep our books, invoices and payment records for 7 years, counted from the end of the financial year the record belongs to rather than from the date on the invoice. That is a legal obligation under Article 6(1)(c), not a choice we make, and it is why erasing your account cannot erase an invoice we have already issued. It covers the accounting trail only — never your call telemetry, which goes with the account.

11.Your rights, and how to use them

If the GDPR applies to you, you have the rights below. Two of them are buttons in the product; for the rest, email info@vigil.tools and we will respond without undue delay and within one month of receipt. If complexity or the number of requests justifies an extension under Article 12(3), we will explain it within that first month; the extension can be up to two further months. Requests are normally free of charge. Any refusal or fee must meet the GDPR conditions and be explained, together with your complaint and judicial-remedy rights. Where we process your data on a customer's behalf, we assist that customer with your request under the DPA.

  • Access (Art. 15) — your call and error history is visible in the dashboard and exportable as CSV from Settings, and Settings → Export everything downloads one JSON file with every row we hold against your account — the fingerprints, tool names and request paths of section 6 among them — plus your account record. Two columns are left out of that file and named in it: the digest of each Vigil API key and the digest of the provider credential on each call, because a copy of either belongs in no file that travels. For anything you cannot find there, ask us.
  • Erasure (Art. 17) — Settings → Delete account. It is immediate and irreversible; what outlives it is listed below, under “What survives a deletion”. Settings → Delete all data is the narrower version: it clears your call and error history and leaves the account open. Clearing your data keeps the monthly usage meter, by design — see immediately below.
  • Rectification (Art. 16) — your settings are editable in the product. Telemetry is an append-only record of what actually happened and is not editable; if you believe a row is wrong, tell us.
  • Portability (Art. 20) — the CSV exports in Settings are machine-readable and yours to take anywhere. The statutory right applies to personal data you provided where processing is automated and based on consent or a contract; where technically feasible, you may request direct transfer to another controller. The JSON export under Access is the complete, machine-readable copy; contact us if you need it in another form.
  • Restriction and objection (Arts. 18, 21) — email us. Where we rely on legitimate interests you can object, and we will stop unless we demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds that override your interests, rights and freedoms, or the processing is needed for legal claims. An objection to direct marketing stops processing for that purpose without that balancing test.
  • Withdraw consent (Art. 7(3)) — we rely on consent for two things, the analytics cookies and the advertising cookie in section 16, and you can withdraw either on its own from Cookie settings in the footer of any public page; it takes effect immediately, and refusing or withdrawing costs you nothing. Withdrawal does not affect the lawfulness of processing before you withdrew consent. Nothing else we do rests on consent, so there is nothing else here to withdraw.
  • Complain to a supervisory authority (Art. 77) — you can complain to the authority where you habitually live or work, or where the alleged infringement took place. Ours is Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens.

What survives a deletion, and why

One record is deliberately kept when you clear your data: the usage meter. It holds, per billing period (before the switch to plan limits on money saved: the calendar month) and keyed to your account id, how many calls we counted toward your plan, how much optimised spend they represented and when that count last changed — with the per-prompt-shape checksums, the notes of calls it failed to count, or failed to count in full, and, since 10 October 2026, how much Vigil saved you, the moments that first reached 80% and 100% of your plan’s limit, and the lifetime row, that section 3 lists. It contains no prompts, no models and no agent names.

Why it is not cleared. Plan limits are counted from this meter rather than from your call history, precisely so that deleting history cannot reset them. If the meter followed the history down, “Delete all data” would become a way to reset a period’s allowance and start the period again — once for every customer, every period — or, on the Free plan, to reset a once-ever limit. The meter only ever counts upward within a period, and a new period starts it at zero regardless; the lifetime row never restarts.

So Delete all data removes your call and error history and leaves that meter standing. Your plan limits continue to reflect the traffic you actually sent this period. Deleting your account is different: the meter goes with it, because the reason above stops applying the moment there is no allowance left to reset.

Deleting your account leaves two kinds of record behind: billing and accounting records, for the period in section 9, and the sign-in entries in Supabase's service logs (section 8), for as long as Supabase keeps them.

You do not need to explain why you want access to your personal data. Requests are normally free; the limited GDPR exceptions described above apply. If we cannot identify you from what you send us, we may ask only for the additional information necessary to confirm your identity and avoid disclosing your data to someone else.

12.Who else processes it

The providers below support the activities described in this policy. Their role depends on the particular service: a provider may act as our processor, as an independent controller, or under another arrangement that must be assessed for that activity. This inventory is not a claim that every provider is a sub-processor for your AI traffic. Each receives only what it needs. Your prompt and response content reaches only Cloudflare, which runs the proxy and reads it in memory, and the AI provider you deliberately route to — apart from the one fragment in section 6, which is stored with Supabase. The subprocessor page shows the same list with each company's legal entity, its own data processing terms and the mechanism that covers a transfer out of the EEA.

ProviderWhat it doesWhat it receivesWhere
SupabaseDatabase and authenticationEverything in sections 3, 4, 6 and 8, and the detector findings in section 5; your email and sign-in identity. The sign-in entries in its own service logs (section 8) are kept apart from our database, in a region we have not confirmedCentral EU (Frankfurt) · eu-central-1
CloudflareRuns the proxy at api.vigil.tools and api.vigil.wtfYour full request and response, in memory, in transitGlobal edge network
VercelHosts the dashboard at vigil.toolsHTTP request data for pages you loadGlobal edge network
ResendSends account emails: confirming your email address, resetting your password, and telling you when your plan’s limit on money saved is near or reachedYour email address and the email itself, including its one-time link or the saved figure. Nothing from the proxy or your call dataUnited States
StripePaymentsYour email, billing name and address, VAT number if you give one, and card details — which go to Stripe directly and never reach usUnited States / Ireland
GitHubOAuth sign-in, only if you use itThat you signed in; returns the profile fields in section 3United States
GoogleOAuth sign-in, only if you use itThat you signed in; returns the profile fields in section 3United States
The AI provider you route toAnswers your API callsYour full request, including anything in your promptsDetermined by the provider you choose
PlausibleCounts visits to the public pages, if analytics is enabled, sign-ups and new paid plansThat a page was loaded, and the fields in section 16 — no cookie, no identifier, no IP address stored. When an account is created or a paid plan starts, that it did, with the campaign tags from section 10, and for a paid plan the amount and currency. No email address, no nameEuropean Union
Google AnalyticsCounts visits to the public pages — only if you accept analytics cookiesThat a public page was loaded, its address, your browser and device type, and the _ga identifiers in section 16; a coarse location derived from your IP address, which Google says it discards and does not log or store for visitors in the EU, Switzerland and the UKUnited States (collected through servers in the EU)
PostHogCounts visits to the public pages — only if you accept analytics cookiesThat a public page was loaded, its address and title, the page you came from and the page your visit started on, your browser and operating system, device type, screen size, language and time zone, and the ph_ identifier in section 16; your IP address, which reaches PostHog with each report as it does any server. No click, no form, nothing from the proxy, the dashboard or your account. Nothing at all if you declineEuropean Union (PostHog is a United States company)
RedditAdvertising attribution — only if you accept advertising cookiesThat a public page was visited, that you viewed the pricing, docs or a blog page, that you clicked a sign-up button, and that you created an account, connected your first agent or started a paid plan if you did, with the amount and currency for a paid plan. All are tied to the _rdt_uuid identifier in section 16. Each carries the ad click's identifier, rdt_cid, if an ad brought you; the reports from our server also carry the IP address and browser user agent your sign-up request had (section 10). No email address, no name, nothing else from the proxy, the dashboard or your account. Nothing at all if you declineUnited States

The last row is the one to read twice. Vigil forwards your request to Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Mistral or whichever provider you addressed. That provider receives your prompt in full and processes it under its terms, in whatever region it operates. Choosing the provider is your decision and we do not override it. Your relationship with them is yours, and their data handling is theirs to describe.

13.International transfers

Our database and authentication run in the EU — Central EU (Frankfurt) (eu-central-1). That is where your account and your telemetry are stored at rest.

It does not follow that Vigil is EU-only, and we are not going to imply it is. The proxy runs on Cloudflare's edge network, which means your request is processed at whichever location is nearest to the machine making the call. The dashboard is served the same way by Vercel. Supabase keeps its service logs, which hold the sign-in entries described in section 8, apart from our database, and we have not confirmed where. Stripe processes in the United States and Ireland. GitHub and Google process sign-ins in the United States. Resend, which sends your account emails, processes them in the United States. And the AI provider you route to processes wherever it operates.

The transfers here that are yours to switch off are the consented ones. If you accept analytics cookies, Google Analytics receives your public-page visits — collected on servers in the EU, by a United States company — and so does PostHog, on servers in the European Union, run by a United States company; and if you accept advertising cookies, Reddit receives your public-page visit in the United States. Decline either answer, or withdraw it later from Cookie settings, and that transfer does not happen at all. Those are the only rows in section 12 that work that way — the rest are needed to run the service and are not optional in the same sense.

Where those transfers leave the EEA, each rests on a mechanism in the European Commission's own terms, incorporated by the provider's data processing terms. Cloudflare, Vercel, Resend, Stripe and PostHog are listed in the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework and also carry the Commission's Standard Contractual Clauses (2021/914) in their terms; GitHub and Google state that they comply with the Framework and rely on the Clauses otherwise; Supabase, a Singapore company, and Reddit, which is not in the Framework, rest on the Clauses alone; Plausible is an EU company and makes no transfer. The subprocessor page links each company's terms and Framework entry. We have not independently audited the transfer mechanism of every AI provider a customer might route to — section 19 says so rather than implying we have.

14.Security

  • Everything travels over TLS. The proxy refuses plain HTTP.
  • Row-level security is enabled on every table, keyed to your account, so one customer cannot read another's rows through the API.
  • Vigil API keys are stored as SHA-256 digests. A key is displayed once, at creation, and cannot be recovered — if you lose one, revoke it and mint another.
  • Your provider API keys are never stored. A call record can hold a keyed digest of the provider key the request carried (section 4): it cannot be turned back into the key, and without the secret Vigil holds it cannot be matched to one either.
  • Card details never touch our servers. Checkout and the billing portal are hosted by Stripe.
  • Prompt and response bodies are never written to disk, so a database compromise does not expose them.

No service can promise it will not be breached, and we are not going to. What we can say is what we hold: your account records and the usage meter in section 3, the call record and the scores you send in section 4, the detector findings in section 5, and the refused-request record in section 8 — the blast radius of a compromise of our database is those records, the one fragment in section 6 included, not your customers' conversations.

The security page says the same things in plain words: what passes through, what is kept, where it lives and how to delete it.

15.If there is a breach

When we act as controller, we will notify the competent supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of awareness, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to individuals' rights and freedoms. We will explain any delay and provide further information in phases where necessary. Where a breach is likely to result in high risk, we will also inform affected people without undue delay as Article 34 requires, subject to its exceptions. We will document breaches and the reasons for notification decisions. When we act as processor, we notify the customer without undue delay and within the 48-hour maximum promised in the DPA; we do not wait for the controller's 72-hour deadline.

16.Cookies

We set the cookies needed to keep you signed in. Those are strictly necessary to provide a service you asked for, so they need no permission and you will not be asked about them. There is no session recorder anywhere in Vigil, and the signed-in dashboard sets nothing beyond the session itself — no advertising cookie, no analytics cookie, no tracker. The reports that start there come from our server, when a new account first arrives or a paid plan starts, and section 10 describes them.

The public pages can run three more things, and they are the ones we have to ask about. The first is Google Analytics, which counts visits to the public pages. If you accept, Google's tag stores two cookies on this domain, each set to expire after two years, or sooner where your browser caps cookie lifetimes: _ga, an identifier that tells one browser apart from another, and _ga_ followed by our property's id, which keeps track of your session. On each public page you visit here, the tag sends Google a report carrying those identifiers, the page's address and your browser and device type. Google says it uses your IP address only to derive a coarse location, on servers in the EU, and then discards it, and that it does not log or store IP addresses from visitors in the EU, Switzerland or the UK; for that we rely on Google's statement rather than our own testing. We use the reports for visitor counts and nothing else. Until you accept, the script is not loaded and no request is made to Google at all. Withdrawing removes both cookies and reloads the page. Google is a United States recipient — section 12 lists it and section 13 covers the transfer.

The second is PostHog, which also counts visits to the public pages, and shares the analytics answer with Google Analytics: one box covers both. If you accept, PostHog's script stores one identifier on this domain under the name ph_ followed by our project's key and _posthog, as a cookie set to expire after a year, or sooner where your browser caps cookie lifetimes, and again in your browser's local storage; and it keeps a few entries in your browser's session storage, under the same ph_ prefix, that tell its tabs apart and that your browser clears when you close the tab. On each public page you visit here, it sends PostHog one report, carrying that identifier, the page's address and title, the page you came from and the page your visit started on, your browser and operating system, device type, screen size, language and time zone. That is the whole report — we read it off a real browser rather than off PostHog's documentation — and we have switched off everything else the script can do: it does not record what you click or type, it does not record your session, and it loads nothing beyond itself. Your IP address reaches PostHog's servers with each report, as it does any server you contact; whether PostHog keeps it is a setting at their end, and we do not claim here that it is discarded. We use the reports for visitor counts and nothing else. Until you accept, the script is not started and no request is made to PostHog at all. Withdrawing removes the identifier and the session entries and reloads the page. PostHog is a United States recipient — section 12 lists it, with where its servers are, and section 13 covers the transfer.

The third is Reddit's advertising pixel. If you accept, it stores an identifier cookie, _rdt_uuid, on this domain, set to expire after 90 days, and a settings entry, _rdt_cfg, in your browser's session storage, which your browser clears when you close the tab. If you came here by clicking one of our ads on Reddit, the address you arrived on carries Reddit's identifier for that click. If you accept while it does, the pixel stores that identifier as a second cookie, _rdt_cid, on this domain, set to expire after 90 days. It holds the click identifier and nothing else, and it tells Reddit which of its ad clicks brought you here. Like the rest, it is never set before you accept. On each page you visit here, the pixel sends a report to Reddit's servers at alb.reddit.com, carrying _rdt_uuid and, if you have one, _rdt_cid. That is how Reddit learns that a visit followed one of our ads, and how it can connect that visit to your Reddit account, if you have one. Until you accept, the script is not loaded and no request is made to Reddit at all. Decline and the page behaves identically; there is nothing behind the prompt that refusing costs you. You can change your answer whenever you like, from Cookie settings in the footer of any public page. Withdrawing removes all of them, _rdt_cid included, and reloads the page, so the script is gone rather than merely told to stop. On the pricing, docs and blog pages the pixel also reports that you viewed content, and a click on a sign-up button that you showed interest; both are the same report to the same address, under the same answer. _rdt_uuid, with the click identifier, your IP address and browser user agent recorded when you signed up, is also what lets us tell Reddit if you go on to create an account, connect your first agent or start a paid plan — reports sent from our server, described in section 10 — so removing it stops those too. Reddit is a United States recipient — section 12 lists it and section 13 covers the transfer.

We also store your answer itself, as vigil-consent-v1 in your browser's local storage, so that we do not have to ask again on every page. It holds your choices, one per question, when you made them, and the version of the question you answered — nothing else. It is strictly necessary — it is what makes a “no” stick — and it is set whichever way you answer.

Plausible is separate, and your answers above do not change it — because there is nothing in it to consent to. Where it is enabled, the public pages load Plausible, which counts page views and measures how far down a page you scrolled and how long you stayed. It also notes when you follow a link to another site, download a file, submit a form or click to sign up: the link's or the file's address, and never what you typed. Its script and its reports go through our own address rather than straight to Plausible, so a browser extension that blocks Plausible's address may not stop them, and you can object under section 11. It sets no cookie and writes nothing to your device — we tested that in a browser rather than taking it on trust, and that is why it is not part of the prompt above: consent is required for storing things on your device, and this stores nothing. We could have swept it behind the same banner to look cautious, but it would have implied it does something it does not. For what happens at Plausible's end we rely on their published data policy rather than our own testing: no persistent identifier, no tracking between sites, and your IP address used only to derive a country and a daily-rotating hash, never stored. Plausible processes in the EU only, and is listed in section 12.

17.Children

Vigil is a developer tool and is not directed at children. We do not knowingly collect data from anyone under 16. If you believe a child has created an account, email us and we will delete it.

18.Changes to this policy

When this page changes materially we update the date at the top. For a change that reduces your protections — a new processor, a new category of data, or arming the retention sweep in section 9 — we will update the page before the change takes effect, not after.

19.What this page cannot yet answer

TODO — not yet finalised

Listed here rather than answered with a plausible sentence. Each needs a decision or a lawyer, and writing a confident answer we have not verified would be worse than the gap.
  • Whether our role in your telemetry is purely that of a processor. The processing we perform on customer instructions and any independent service-security purposes must be assessed separately. Section 10 distinguishes them rather than applying our contract or legitimate interests to every end user's data. The detailed purpose-by-purpose role assessment and any required legitimate-interest balancing remain to be completed; this wording is not evidence that those assessments are finished. Contact us before relying on an unresolved role for your own Article 28 assessment.
  • When the retention sweep in section 9 will be armed, and whether the intended windows are the right ones. Until then, that section describes indefinite retention because that is what happens.
  • Whether a DPO is required under Article 37. The assessment described in section 1 has not been completed.
  • Whether every downstream AI provider's transfer mechanism is adequate. We rely on their published terms and have not audited them.
  • Whether this document satisfies any regime other than the GDPR — CCPA, UK GDPR, or others. It was written against the GDPR only.

If one of these matters to your decision to use Vigil, email info@vigil.tools and ask. A direct answer is better than a document that guesses.